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IN THE 
SUPRE1\1E COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD L. STEADMAN and DONNA 
B. STEADMAN, his wife, and 
NORMA E. STEADMAN, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
LAKE HILLS, a corporation, and M. M. 
MERRILL, and LESTER M. JOHN-
SON and JOHNSON ENTER-
PRISES, INC., successors in interest, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10779 
This is a foreclosure commenced by Respondents, as 
mortgagee, in 1961 and based upon two defaults by the 
Appellants, as mortgagor, under a mortgage agreement. 
Subsequent to the resolution of the foreclosure, further pro-
ceedings were held, on Respondents' motion, for the determ-
ination of the issue of attorneys' fees, which issue had not 
been resolved in the previous hearing. The lower court 
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granted Respondents' motion for attorneys' fees and it is 
from that decision that the Appellants take this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Appellants' statement of facts fails to include 
portions of the record which are necessary to proper con-
sideration of the issues herein involved, Respondents make 
this supplemental statement. 
On April 15, 1954, Appellant Lake Hills executed a 
purchase money note and mortgage in the amount of $142,-
200.00 which provided for installments of $15,800.00 pay-
able on the 15th day of April 1955, and $15,800 payable on 
the 15th day of each April thereafter until the total prin-
cipal sum of said indebtedness was paid in full. The terms 
and provisions of the note were directly incorporated into 
the mortgage (R. 5). The mortgage further provided that 
in addition to the payment of the fore going amounts, the 
mortgagor was to pay "all taxes and assesments levied on 
the said mortgaged premises * * * before delinquency 
* * *" (R. 5). Finally, the mortgage provided that "in 
case of default in payment of this note, we agree to pay 
all costs of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee" 
(R. 5), and that "in the event of foreclosure of this mort-
gage, the said mortgagor agrees to pay a reasonable attor-
ney's fee" (R. 6). 
Thereafter, a deed executed by the mortgagor was de-
posited with Walker Bank & Trust Company, as escrow 
agent. Under the terms of the escrow instructions, it was 
provided: 
s 
"In the event buyer shall fail to pay any of the 
aforesaid installments promptly when due, or within 
30 days thereafter, then upon seller's demand, you 
shall deliver to said seller the aforesaid Deed where-
upon your duties, responsibilities and liability of 
every kind and character under the terms of this 
escrow shall cease and terminate" (R. 69). 
Appellants failed to make the $15,800.00 installment 
payment due on or before April 15, 1961 (R. 67). Addi-
tionally, the Appellants had failed to pay taxes for the years 
from 1955 through 1961 and the property had been the sub-
ject of a tax sale (R. 118). Based on the failure of Appel-
lants to pay the annual installment and the taxes, the Re-
spondents elected to foreclose and commenced this fore-
closure on April 20, 1961 (R. 1-3). On October 3, 1961, 
Salt Lake County was joined as a party defendant in the 
action (R. 31) and in its answer to plaintiffs' complaint, it 
was affirmatively alleged that there were delinquent and 
unpaid taxes on the subject property for the years 1958, 
1959, and 1960 totaling $2,167.99 and that by virtue of said 
delinquent and unpaid taxes, Salt Lake County had a para-
mount and superior claim in the property (R. 33-34). The 
matter went to trial on December 7, 1961, and on Decem-
ber 15, 1961, the lower court caused a minute entry to be 
entered in the Register of Actions which provided "no 
cause for action" conditioned on the curing of the default 
(R. 48). 
Subsequently, after numerous attempts had been made 
by the attorneys for the Respondents to obtain formal find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and a formal judgment 
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in the matter, the Respondents' attorneys forwarded to the 
Court proposed findings of fact which included a finding 
for attorneys' fees (R. 38, 41-47). The proposed findings 
of fact remained unsigned by the Court and no formal judg-
ment was ever entered. Nevertheless, by virtue of the fore-
closure, the Respondents were effectively protected, their 
mortgage interest was rendered more secure, and the 
amount secured by the mortgage eventually was paid in 
full except for the attorneys' fees here in question. 
Appellant Lake Hills filed bankruptcy pursuant to 
Chapter XI of the Federal Bankruptcy Act and it was not 
until September 10, 1964, that a successor-in-interest was 
appointed for Lake Hills. Appellant Lake Hills' successor-
in-interest made the installment payments thereafter. Prior 
to the last installment payment, which was due and payable 
on April 15, 1966, the Respondents filed an amended and 
supplemental complaint, alleging that the Appellant Lake 
Hills' successor-in-interest, had agreed to pay the Respon-
dents' attorneys' fees, but had thereafter refused to make 
such payment (R. 50-52). That amended and supplemental 
complaint was later dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of 
the parties wherein it was agreed that the Appellants would 
pay into Court the sum of $5,000.00 and that the issue of 
attorneys' fees in that amount would be submitted for de-
termination by the Court (R. 53-56). 
On September 23, 1966, the issue of attorneys' fees 
was presented to the Court on stipulated facts (R. 66-74). 
Based on those stipulated facts and the uncontroverted 
testimony adduced at the hearing that Respondents' counsel 
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had spent 192 hours on the prosecution of the foreclosure 
action (R. 107), the Court awarded Respondents' attorneys 
fees in the sum of $3,500.00. 
On October 19, 1966, the original trial judge entered 
an order nunc pro tune pursuant to a conversation had with 
counsel for both parties, specifically reserving the issue of 
attorneys' fees (R. 82-83). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO ATTOR-
NEYS' FEES DEPENDS ON THE TERMS OF 
THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT AND NOT ON 
THE OUTCOME OF THE LITIGATION. 
It is well settled in Utah that the right to an award of 
attorneys' fees does not exist separate and apart from con-
tractual or statutory provision. Hawkins v. Perry, 123 
Utah 16, 253 P. 2d 372; Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hart-
ford Acc. & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 32'5 P. 2d 906. Thus, 
in determining whether, as an initial proposition, attorneys' 
fees may be awarded to a party, the court must look to the 
terms of an applicable statute, if any, or to the terms of 
the contract. 
Section 78-37-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, providing 
in pertinent part that * * * "In all cases of foreclos-
ure when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the 
amount thereof shall be fixed by the court * * *", is 
not determinative of the existence of a right to attorneys' 
fees but rather provides that once the right is established, 
the reasonableness of the fees must be a matter for the 
court to decide. There being no other statutory provisions 
giving rise or denying a right to attorneys' fees, this 
court must then look, as did the court below, to the terms 
of the mortgage agreement to Jetermine the nature and 
extent of Respondents' right. 
The mortgage agreement in this instance contains two 
separate stipulations by the mortgagors for the payment of 
attorneys' fees (R. 5, 6). The first stipulation provides: 
"In case of default in payment of this note, we 
agree to pay all costs of collection including a rea-
sonable attorneys' fee" (R. 5). 
The terms and provisions of the note were incorporated 
into the body of the mortgage and were thus a part thereof. 
The second stipulation provides: 
"In the event of foreclosure of this mortgage 
the said Mortgagor agrees to pay a reasonable at-
torneys' fee" (R. 6). 
On the face of the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor 
twice undertook to pay a reasonable attorneys' fee, condi-
tioned, disjunctively, on a "default" in the first instance 
and a "foreclosure" in the other. 
The prime question before the Court then is whether 
one or the other, or both, of these conditions occurred. Since 
the existence of default is preliminary to fore closure, they 
will be treated in that order in the following discussion. 
(a) The Appellants were in default under the terms 
of the Mortgage Agreement. 
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Under the terms of the mortgage agreement, the mort-
gagor was obligated, by virtue of his covenants, to pay an-
nual installments in the sum of $15,800.00 on or before the 
15th day of April of each year until the principal and inter-
est were paid (R. 5). Additionally, the mortgagor was ob-
ligated to pay "all taxes * * * before delinquency * * *" 
(R. 5). 
The record clearly illustrates that the mortgagor was 
in default regarding the payment of the 1961 annual in-
stallment as required by the mortgage agreement. Appel-
lants admitted this fact in their answers to plaintiffs' in-
terrogatories ( R. 13, 15). They stipulated to this fact in 
the Stipulated Facts (R. 67). The record likewise illustrates 
that they had failed to pay taxes before delinquency for 
three years (R. 33, 67). On this appeal, Appellants have 
again acknowledged the fact of the default under the mort-
gage agreement (Appellants' Brief, pp. 3, 9). By way of 
excuse, Appellants claim that the taxes were abated before 
suit, but the record does not support them on this (R. 33, 
34). 
Thus, that the Appellants were in default under the 
very terms of the mortgage agreement at the time of the 
commencement of the foreclosure action, is not here an 
issue nor was it below. 
By way of additional excuse for the defaults, Appel-
lants assert that an escrow agreement was executed, albeit 
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, under which 
a warranty deed was delivered to the escrow agent with in-
structions that in the event of default, under the mortgage, 
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and after the expiration of thirty (30) days, the deed was 
to be delivered to the mortgagee. The Appellants refer to 
this thirty-day period as a "thirty-day grace period" and 
assert that by virtue of the separately existing escrow 
agreement, the obligations of the mortgagor under the 
mortgage were rendered meaningless. 
Rather than to take away the mortgagee's remedies 
under the mortgage, however, the patent purpose of the 
escrow arrangement was to provide the mortgagee with 
an additional remedy in the event of a default. The escrow 
agreement does not refer, except by implication, to the 
mortgage, and does not purport to amend or alter the terms 
thereof. Moreover, there is no term in the escrow agree-
ment which limits or lessens the mortgagor's duties and 
obligations under the mortgage agreement (R. 69). The 
terms of neither document were dependent upon the terms 
of the other, nor were the terms of either incorporated into 
the other. It is well settled that subsequent documents 
affect the terms of a prior mortgage agreement only where 
they clearly purport so to do, or are incorporated therein 
by reference. Knight v. Kitchin, 261 N. Y. S. 809; Patter-
son v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336. 
Therefore, the mortgagee had two remedies available: 
under the mortgage and note, upon default in payment of 
the annual installment and taxes, the mortgage clearly had 
the right to declare the full amount of the mortgage due 
and owing (R. 5) and to foreclose thereon; Thompson v. 
Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477; Hill v. Schultz, 71 Idaho 
145, 227 P. 2d 586; Welder v. Director, 118 Cal. App. 124, 
4 P. 2d 793; under the escrow agreement, if the mortgagor 
failed to make the annual installment payment within thirty 
days after the date of payment set forth in the mortgage 
agreement, the mortgagee could, alternatively, require de-
livery of an already executed deed conveying the premises 
to him to further protect his substantial monetary interest 
therein. The purpose for such an arrangement is clear: 
To provide the mortgagee with an additional remedy in the 
event of default whereby he could simply and inexpensively 
make himself more secure. 
As a result of the two-fold default, Respondents were 
required, if they were to protect their secured interest, to 
enforce collection. The mortgagors' duty was obvious in 
this situation - they were bound to pay all costs of collec-
tion including a reasonable attorneys' fee if they defaulted, 
and their liability for those costs accrued at the commence-
ment of the action. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 
160 Ore. 679, 86 P. 2d 960. 
It is submitted that the escrow agreement provided no 
excuse for Appellants' admitted defaults, and that Appel-
lants had objectively and explicitly breached their coven-
ants in the mortgage agreement as of the time of com-
mencement of the foreclosure action. 
(b) There was a "foreclosure" arising out of Appel-
lants' defaults. 
The mortgagor additionally undertook, by virtue of ex-
press provision in the mortgage agreement, to pay reason-
able attorneys' fees "in the event of foreclosure". Such a 
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provision "* * * is intended as an indemnity to the 
mortgagee for expenditures necessarily made to protect his 
interests." 1 Jones on Mortgages, §442. The law supports 
such a provision for attorneys' fees on the theory that it 
encourages the extension of credit while at the same time 
protecting the creditor from the financial burden resulting 
from the debtor's default. In this light then, an assertion, 
such as that which Appellants have made - that Respon-
dents are entitled to attorneys' fees only in the event of a 
foreclosure decree and sale - is contrary to the very reason 
for providing for attorneys' fees by contractual arrange-
ment. Moreover, such an assertion is contrary to the terms 
of the mortgage agreement. The mortgage agreement does 
not provide for payment of attorneys' fees "in the event of 
a foreclosure sale;" it provides for attorneys' fees "in the 
event of foreclosure." As the court said in Insurance Co. 
of North America v. Cheatham, 299 S. W. '545 (Ky.): 
"* * * the term 'foreclosure' is used to mean the insti-
tution of suit to enforce a lien against property. * * *" 
(Emphasis supplied). For this reason, it is said that the 
mortgagee's right to attorneys' fees accrues at the com-
mencement of the foreclosure action and not at the end 
end thereof. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 160 Ore. 
679, 86 P. 2d 960; Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220, 176 P. 42; 
59 C. J. S., Mortgages §812 (b); 1 Jones on Mortgages §442. 
Moreover, the allowance of an attorneys' fee is not depen-
dent upon the actual collection of the mortgage debt, In re 
Peerless Weaving & Throwing Co., 259 Fed. 610, but rather 
upon the terms of mortgage agreement, Watson v. Sawyer, 
12 Wash. 35, 40 P. 413. 
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While there are instances where the attorneys' fee has 
not been allowed in the absence of a successful prosecution 
of the foreclosure action, those instances are based either 
on strict statutory requirements or on the express terms of 
the mortgage agreement. See In re Ebert, 140 F. Supp. 
597. 
When the Respondents found themselves faced with 
two defaults by Appellants, neither of which was insub-
stantial in light of the dollar amounts involved, they were 
confronted with the necessity of instituting a foreclosure 
proceeding to protect their interests. They retained coun-
sel to accomplish this, and ultimately, this was accomplished. 
The condftion for the accrual of a right to attorneys' fees 
arose by virtue of the necessary and timely institution 
of the foreclosure. 
It should be noted in passing that while Appellants 
have argued that the term "foreclosure" refers to the "end 
result," their own cited authorities recognize that "foreclos-
ure" means a "proceeding" and that the term applies ''to 
the enforcement of a mortgage by any form of legal pro-
ceeding." 59 C. J. S., Mortgages §482 at 762 (Emphasis 
supplied). 
It is submitted that under the terms of the mortgage 
agreement, "the event of foreclosure" had occurred and 
that, thereupon, Respondents, as the lower court found, 
were entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee. 
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POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF LACHES, ESTOPPEL, THE 
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, AND HEARING 
BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE, WERE NOT 
RAISED OR OBJECTED TO AT ANY TIME 
PRIOR TO THIS APPEAL, AND THE APPEL-
LANTS ARE NOT NOW ENTITLED TO RELY 
ON THE SAME. 
The Appellants have not at any time prior to this ap-
peal raised the issue of laches, the issue of estoppel, the 
issue of the validity of the nunc pro tune order or the issue 
of which division of the District Court could hear Respon-
dents' claim for attorneys' fees; nor have Appellants ever 
made objection thereto until now. 
In this regard, it suffices for the Respondents to point 
out that issues and objections not raised at the trial level 
may not be raised or asserted for the first time on appeal. 
Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Improvement Dist. 
No. 1, 15 U. 2d 216, 390 P. 2d 235; Tygesen v. Magna Water 
District, 13 U. 2d. 397, 375 P. 2d 456; Carson v. Douglas, 
12 U. 2d 424, 367 P. 2d 462; Drummond v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 111 Utah 289, 117 P. 2d 903. 
Moreover, neither the issue of the claimed irregularity 
of a hearing on attorneys' fees by a different division of the 
lower court than the one originally hearing the matter, nor 
the claim that the "judgment" was not supported by find-
ings and conclusions, was designated by Appellants as a 
point on appeal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 75 ( d), 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 87), and both were thus 
waived on this appeal by Appellants. In reliance of Appel-
lants' designation of points on appeal, the Respondents did 
not have the entire record designated (R. 92-93) and were 
prejudiced thereby. 
For the foregoing reasons, none of the issues raised 
in Appellants' Brief under Points III, IV or V are entitled 
to consideration by this Court on appeal. 
POINT III. 
ACCEPTANCE OF PART PAYMENT AFTER 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE 
• ACTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER 
OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
Appellants assert that the Respondents waived their 
right to attorneys' fees by a subsequent acceptance of in-
stallments under the mortgage after the commencement of 
the action. 
Initially, it is noteworthy that Respondents did no.t 
accept any payments until after the Minute Entry of De-
cember 1961 had been entered. However, even if the Re-
spondents had accepted an installment immediately after 
the institution of foreclosure, the law is clear that accept-
ance of a part payment does not constitute a waiver of at-
torneys' fees. Uedelhofen v. Mason, 20 Ill. 465, 66 N. E. 
364; Harris v. Whittier Building & Loan Assn., 18 Cal. 
App. 2d 260, 63 P. 2d 840; Bisno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 714, 
14 
346 P. 2d 814. Since the entire balance became due and 
owing under the terms of the mortgage upon Appellants' 
default (R. 5), th~ tender of any given installment was 
merely a part payment, and as the court said in Sellman v. 
Crosby, 20 Cal. App. 2d 562, 67 P. 2d 706, 707: 
"* * * we are of the opinion that a credi-
tor, at least in the absence of an express agreement 
to the contrary, may accept partial payments on 
the amount due without waiving the default as to 
the balance and without affecting his rights under 
the acceleration clause. In other words, no implied 
waiver results from the mere acceptance of such 
partial payments." 
Jones, in his treatise on mortgages ha& stated that: 
"Under a stipulation for the payment of attor-
ney's fees in case a suit for foreclosure is brought, 
payment or tender of payment of the Mortgage debt 
after the bringing of the suit * * * does not 
relieve the Mortgagor from his agreement." ( 3 
Jones on Mortgages, §2059) 
Applying this rule to the facts presently before the 
Court, it can scarcely be said that an acceptance of install-
ments after trial constitutes any more reason for finding a 
waiver than acceptance of installments before trial. 
Appellants have, in their Brief, raised another argu-
ment in support of a waiver: That Respondents did not 
seek to enforce their claim for attorneys' fee for some four 
years after the original trial. This argument is interwoven 
with Appellants' de novo assertion of laches, and like laches, 
was not raised in the trial court. Appellants' failure to 
raise the issue there was grounded on good cause since they 
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knew full well that after the foreclosure trial, the property 
became subject to a Federal Bankruptcy proceeding, that 
not until as late as 1964 were the original defendants' suc-
cessors-in-interest appointed and that not until the time of 
payment of the last installment in 1966 did any question of 
entitlement to attorneys' fee arise between the parties (R. 
50-52). 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY IS 
NOT A JUDGMENT RENDERING THE ISSUE 
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES RES JUDICATA AND 
THUS NOT CONCLUSIVE ON THAT ISSUE. 
The original trial court made no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law and entered no formal written decree or 
judgment. I ts purported ruling "no cause for action" is 
found only in a Minute Entry in the Court's Docket Book. 
Appellants have argued that the Minute Entry was 
conclusive on the issue of attorneys' fees. The theory on 
which this argument is based is unclear to the Respondents; 
however, it is presumed that it is grounded on the principle 
of res judicata. 
Res judicata assumes the existence of a final judgment 
which is, or at least purports to be dispositive of the issues 
before the Court. In the present matter, there was no judg-
ment, for, as this Court has ruled numerous times, a Minute 
Entry is not a judgment, not a decree, and, consequently, 
not conclusive or dispositive of anything. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P. 2d 
16 
919; Robison v. Fillmore Commercial & Savings Bank, 61 
Utah 398, 213 P. 790; Utah State Building Board v. Walsh 
Plumbing Co., 16 U. 2d 249, 399 P. 2d 141. 
These decisions are supported by Rule 58A ( c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: 
"A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes * * * when the same 
is signed and filed as herein above provided." 
Paragraph (b) of the same rule provides: 
"* * * all judgments shall be signed by the 
judge and filed with the clerk." 
The doctrine of res judicata does not pertain until 
there is a judgment which is dispositive of legal and factual 
issues. There being no such judgment or decree here, it is 
impossible, as a matter of basic legal theory, to say that the 
doctrine of res judicata applied to preclude the issue of at-
torneys' fees. 
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the Minute 
Entry did constitute a judgment, it is contrary to the ele-
mentary policy reasons for the doctrine of res judicata to 
contend that the Minute Entry purported to dispose of the 
issue of attorneys' fees since it was left unresolved by any 
term of or expression in the Minute Entry. Res judicata 
applies only to those issues, both legal and factual, which 
have been clearly disposed of on the face of the judgment. 
Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P. 2d 390; Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, supra. Applying these 
principles, it is unnecessary for a court to reserve for sub-
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sequent disposition, issues which have not been resolved 
and of which disposition has not been made. Since the 
issue of attorneys' fees was raised by the pleadings (R. 3) 
and was not disposed of at the formal foreclosure trial, its 
resolution was left open by the omission of any reference 
thereto in the Court's Minute Record, and by the failure to 
enter a judgment. Rule 54(b) appears to comport with 
this proposition when it provides: 
"* * * any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates less than all 
the claims shall not terminate the action as to any 
of the claims and the order or other form of decision 
is subject to revision at any time before entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims." 
The original trial judge, when confronted with the 
issue by counsel for both parties, agreed that the matter of 
attorneys' fees was to have been reserved, and went farther 
than is required by Rule 54(b) by entering an order nunc 
pro tune, with the consent of both parties, expressly reserv-
ing that issue (R. 82-83). 
In the absence of a final and formal judgment, sup-
ported by findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in 
light of the manifestation of the original trial court's un-
mistakable intention to reserve that issue by the nunc pro 
tune order, it cannot be said that the Minute Entry was 
conclusive on or dispositive of the issue of attorneys' fees. 
That issue was properly disposed of at the hearing from 
which this appeal is taken. 
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POINT V. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ARE NOT IN THIS INSTANCE RE-
QUIRED TO SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S 
"JUDGMENT". 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Appellants have not 
waived their present assertion that the lower court's award 
of attorneys' fees was not supported by "sufficient" find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, by their failure to des-
ignate same as a point on this appeal, (See, Point II, supra), 
the following is noted: 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in pertinent part: 
"In all actions tried * * * the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered * * * Findings of fact and conclusions' 
of law are unnecessary on decision of motions under 
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as pro-
vided in Rule 41 (b) [pertaining to involuntary dis-
missal]." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The issue of attorneys' fees was brought before the 
lower court on Respondents' motion, which motion was in 
the form of a "Petition for Attorneys' Fees" (R. 57-59). 
Historically, a "petition" is a "written motion" for an 
order of the court, the term "motion" - again historically-
meaning an "oral application" for an order of the court. 
In re Levy's Estate, 46 A. 2d 82 (New Jersey); Shaft V. 
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Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 67 New York 
544. Thus: 
"The principal distinction between motions and 
petitions lies in the fact that motions * * * 
may sometimes be made orally, while a petition is 
always in writing." (Gibbs v. Ewing, 113 So. 730 
(Fla.)) 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(b) 
( 1) , all motions "* * * unless made during a hearing 
or trial, shall be made in writing * * * ." By virtue of 
that provision, the historical distinction between motions 
and petitions is abrogated, and in our present practice "mo-
tion" and "petition" are two terms denoting a "written ap-
plication" for a decision of the court. The Respondents' 
petition, here in question, purports to be no more than a 
written motion for a decision of the court establishing a 
reasonable attorneys' fee in a still pending action (R. 57-
59). 
Viewed in this perspective, the lower court went fur-
ther than it was required to do in disposing of Respondents' 
petition when it made the findings and conclusions that it 
did, for none was required. The findings and conclusions 
herein were a mere gratuity and Appellants' argument that 
they were not sufficient means little in the light of the fact 
that they were not even necessary. 
As to the argument of Appellants that "any judgment 
must be based upon findings of fact" (Appellants' Brief, p. 
27), Respondents submit that this is not the law of Utah. 
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Rule 54 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provijes: 
"'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies 
* * *" 
"Since the Judgment" obtained here, and from which 
this appeal is taken amounts to an order, in its terms and 
effect, based on Respondents' "application," and since the 
term "Judgment" includes an oder from which an appeal 
lies, it makes little difference whether that particular docu-
ment in question was denominated "Judgment" as it was 
(R. 75), or "Order" as it could have been, so far as a re-
quirement of findings and conclusions is concerned. The 
essential question lies in the effect and not the name. As 
noted above, finding and conclusion are not required for 
·jecisions of motions, Rule 52 (a), supra. The "Judgment" 
here was no more than a decision of a motion. 
The cases cited by Appellants in support of their as-
sertion either involve a "judgment" based upon all of the 
pleadings and not merely upon a motion of one of the par-
ties or are antedated by the Rules of Procedure, and, conse-
quently, are not helpful or pertinent to the present question. 
See, F. M. A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 U. 2d 
80, 404 P. 2d 670, Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 2d 43, 
278 P. 2d 285, In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 
P. 103. 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondents submit that the 
question of the sufficiency of the findings of fact anj con-
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clusions of law is nugatory when neither findings nor con-
clusions were required. 
POINT VI. 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE LOWER 
COURT THAT $3,500.00 WAS A REASONABLE 
ATTORNEYS' FEE DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
As noted above under Point I, Section 78-37-9, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's 
fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the amount thereof 
shall be fixed by the court. * * *" 
This section contemplates that a reasonable sum will 
be awarded as an attorney's fee and that what constitutes 
a reasonable sum must in each case be determined in the 
discretion of the trial court. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 
Utah 320, 145 P. 1036. The factors which the court must 
consider in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's 
fee are the amount in controversy - here, in excess of 
$90,000.00 - and the amount of labor and responsibility 
imposed on the attorney - here, in excess of 190 hours. 
Jens en v. Lichtenstein, supra. 
In addition to the above facts, the lower court in this 
matter was aided by the uncontroverted testimony of an-
other attorney (R. 110-117) to the effect that, in light of 
the labor, time and responsibilities involved in the prosecu-
tion of this foreclosure, a fee of $5,000.00 would be reason-
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able (R. 114). Moreover, a calculation of the fee granted 
by the lower court, - $3,500.00 - divided by the total 
hours spent - 192 - amounts to $18.00 per hour, which 
is the minimum sum suggested by the Utah State Bar for 
consultation and office work. Utah State Bar Advisory 
Handbook on Office Management and Fees, page 19. 
Under previous decisions of this Court, wherein fees 
from ten per cent to seventy per cent of the amount in 
question have been allowed as "reasonable," Jensen v. Lich-
tenstein, supra; Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Sup-
ply, 17 U. 2d 179, 407 P. 2d 141; Parkinson v. Amundson, 
122 Utah 443, 2·50 P. 2d 944, it can scarcely be said that a 
fee of less than four per cent of the amount in question is 
unreasonable without some showing to that effect by the 
Appellants. Having failed to overcome the evidence ad-
duced by Respondents as to the reasonableness of the fee 
by contrary testimony or evidence, the Appellants are not 
now in a position to assert that the trial court abused its 
discretion in making the award which it did. In light of the 
overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence upon which the 
trial court based its decision, that decision should be sus-
tained on this appeal as one grounded on the sound discre-
tion of the Court in light of the evidence before it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully sub-
mit that the determination of the lower court should be 
affirmed in all respects on this appeal for the following 
reasons: 
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(1) Under the terms of the note and the mortgage 
agreement, Respondents are entitled to a reasonable at-
torneys' fee, said entitlement to an attorneys' fee being 
conditioned on "default" or "foreclosure", both of which 
conditions occurred. 
(2) Appellants' defenses of laches, estoppel and 
waiver were not asserted prior to this appeal. Likewise, 
Appellants' present objection to a hearing by a different 
judge from the one who originally heard the foreclosure, and 
their objection to the issuance nunc pro tune order were 
never asserted or made in the court below. None of these 
matters may be raised for the first time on this appeal. In 
the same category is their claim that the "judgment" from 
which appeal is taken is not sufficiently supported by find-
ings and conclusions since they failed to ·designate the same 
as a point on appeal to the prejudice of Respondents. 
(3) Appellants' assertion that Respondents waived 
their right to attorneys' fees by acceptance of part payment 
after commencement of the action is neither supported by 
law, nor by the facts of the case since part payment was 
not accepted until after the original trial. 
( 4) The trial court's Minute Entry was not a "judg-
ment" and the doctrine of res judicata does not, therefore, 
apply to conclude the question of attorneys' fees. Moreover, 
the issue of attorneys' fees was expressly reserved by an 
order of the original judge, entered nunc· pro tune with the 
consent of counsel for both parties. 
(5) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
expressly not required for decisions on motions and thus, 
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the argument that the findings and conclusions made and 
entered here were insufficient is nugatory in light of the 
fact that the lower court's ruling was a decision on Respon-
dents' motion for attorneys' fees. 
(6) The lower court's determination that $3,500.00 
was a reasonable attorneys' fee is based on the sound dis-
cretion of said court; that determination should not be over-
turned without a showing of an abuse of discretion, which 
showing the Appellants have failed to make here. 
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS,BEHLE, EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR., 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
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